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 II.-344 
THE EIGHTH FOR EDMO: ACCESS TO 
GENDER-AFFIRMING CARE IN PRISONS 
Abstract: In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Edmo v. 
Corizon, Inc. held that a prison’s denial of gender confirmation surgery to a 
transgender prisoner constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit contravened a U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit decision on similar facts. This Comment argues that the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach was correct, as that court properly applied Eighth 
Amendment precedent to assess the quality of care provided to address a prison-
er’s serious medical need. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment limits the government’s ability to impose dispro-
portionately harsh punishments on persons accused or convicted of a crime.1 
The Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment usually evokes 
ideas of medieval torture.2 But the Amendment is also applied to uphold the dig-
nity of incarcerated persons.3 This includes the provision of medical care.4 
Courts have routinely held that the denial of adequate medical care to incarcer-
ated persons cruelly inflicts pain and serves no legitimate penological purpose.5 
In 2002, a federal district court considered medical care under the Eighth 
Amendment in a novel context: the provision of gender-affirming care for in-
carcerated transgender persons.6 In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 2 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675–76 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (recounting 
historic non-capital punishments with similar disapproval); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 
(1878) (describing historic methods of execution considered “atrocities”). 
 3 See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (discussing human dignity and respect as underly-
ing rationales for the Eight Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment); Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 271, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the need for punishments to be 
commensurate with the crime committed, otherwise a prisoner’s dignity is threatened). 
 4 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (holding prison authorities have an obligation to 
provide adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment). 
 5 See, e.g., Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a prison’s failure 
to promptly and adequately treat an inmate’s broken jaw violated the Eighth Amendment). 
 6 See Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D. Mass. 2002) (challenging a 
state corrections agency’s denial of gender-affirming care). Kosilek v. Maloney, a case that the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts decided in 2002, as well as its progeny, center on 
Eighth Amendment violations resulting from denial of gender-affirming medical care in prisons. See 
id. (discussing application of the Eighth Amendment in the context of gender-affirming care in pris-
ons); see, e.g., Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (reviewing the 
constitutionality of a prison’s denial of gender confirmation surgery), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 610 
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Ninth Circuit held in Edmo v. Corizon, Inc. that it was cruel and unusual pun-
ishment for a state prison authority to deny access to gender confirmation sur-
gery (GCS) to Adree Edmo, an incarcerated transgender woman.7 As a result, 
Edmo became the first incarcerated person in the country to be provided access 
to GCS under a court order.8 This decision stood diametrically opposed to a 
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on nearly identical 
facts.9 
Part I of this Comment provides the legal and factual context in which 
Edmo arose.10 Part II examines conflicting holdings across the First, Fifth, and 
Ninth Circuits on whether, and under what circumstances, prisons can legally 
deny GCS.11 Finally, Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit properly applied 
                                                                                                                           
(2020). Some existing scholarship and jurisprudence criticize the treatment of transgender issues in an 
exclusively medical framework. See Esiman Agbemenu, Medical Transgressions in America’s Pris-
ons: Defending Transgender Prisoners’ Access to Transition-Related Care, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 1, 3 (2015) (questioning the validity of framing gender-affirming care for incarcerated transgender 
persons solely in the Eighth Amendment context). Especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2020 
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, there are likely other claims arising under the Fourteenth 
Amendment or statutory civil rights protections that would provide a legal basis for arguing that the 
denial of gender confirmation surgery (GCS) in prisons constitutes discrimination. See 140 S. Ct. 
1731, 1740 (2020) (interpreting “sex discrimination” to include discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity or sexual orientation). These analyses would focus on discrimination on the basis of sex rather 
than the quality or nature of the care given. See id. (holding that a valid cause of action for discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender identity exists under civil rights law). Federal courts have had little oppor-
tunity to rule meaningfully on this line of analysis. See Christina Zhang, Biopolitical and Necropoliti-
cal Constructions of the Incarcerated Trans Body, 37 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 257, 259 (2019) (dis-
cussing case law focusing on the Eighth Amendment). Thus, this Comment confines itself to an eval-
uation of existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See infra notes 124–157 and accompanying text 
(discussing the outcomes of varying Eighth Amendment claims pertaining to the provision of GCS). 
This Comment should not be read, however, as an endorsement of the notion that severe gender dys-
phoria is a necessary prerequisite for GCS. See infra notes 13–123 and accompanying text (discussing 
relevant precedent for a claim of inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment). 
 7 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767. 
 8 See id. (holding that the prison is constitutionally bound to provide GCS); James Dawson, Supreme 
Court Rejects Transgender Inmate Case. What Does That Mean for Adree Edmo?, BOISE STATE PUB. 
RADIO (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/post/supreme-court-rejects-transgender-
inmate-case-what-does-mean-adree-edmo#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/5DFV-4M73] (providing back-
ground information about Edmo’s circumstances and her legal proceedings). 
 9 Compare Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767 (discussing the denial of GCS to an incarcerated transgender 
woman diagnosed with gender dysphoria and holding the denial unconstitutional), with Gibson v. 
Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 215–16 (5th Cir.) (holding that the denial of GCS to an incarcerated 
transgender woman with gender dysphoria can never be unconstitutional), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 653 
(2019). In both cases, a transgender woman plaintiff sued a state prison authority for denial of GCS. 
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 772; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 216. Both women had been diagnosed with gender dys-
phoria and had histories of self-harm resulting from gender dysphoria. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 772; Gib-
son, 920 F.3d at 216. Both the First and Fifth Circuits analyzed the claims under the same Eighth 
Amendment framework but reached disparate outcomes. See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767 (holding that the 
denial of GCS was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 216 (holding 
that the denial of GCS can never be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). 
 10 See infra notes 13–63 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 64–123 and accompanying text. 
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legal precedent and medical consensus to a transgender plaintiff’s specific cir-
cumstances when it held denial of GCS was unconstitutional.12 
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF GENDER-AFFIRMING CARE IN PRISONS 
In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Edmo v. 
Corizon, Inc. that denying a transgender inmate GCS violated the Eighth 
Amendment.13 Section A of this Part discusses the legal background that in-
formed the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate holding.14 Section B provides the factual 
and procedural background of Edmo.15 
A. The Eighth Amendment and Medical Care in Prisons 
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment is 
central to the American legal system.16 The U.S. Supreme Court has applied 
the Amendment to find characteristically barbaric punishments, such as hard 
labor while shackled in irons or the death penalty for minors or mentally hand-
icapped persons, to be cruel and unusual.17 As such, these punishments, and 
other punishments like them, are unequivocally unconstitutional.18 
Underpinning the Amendment are ideas of dignity, humanity, and decen-
cy.19 Its application is informed by ever-changing judicial standards that ensure 
incarcerated persons are not subjected to extreme anguish.20 As such, the 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 124–157 and accompanying text. 
 13 Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
610 (2020). 
 14 See infra notes 16–35 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 36–63 and accompanying text. 
 16 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (barring cruel and unusual punishment). The Eighth Amendment 
directly constrains the federal government, but the Fourteenth Amendment extends its mandates to 
states as well. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
(barring states from acting in a manner that infringes on constitutional rights). 
 17 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the death penalty for minors is 
cruel and unusual); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the death penalty for 
mentally disabled persons is cruel and unusual); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) 
(holding that the use of hard labor in chains as a punishment is cruel and unusual). 
 18 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (barring cruel and unusual punishment); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 
(holding that the death penalty for minors is unconstitutional); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that 
the death penalty for mentally disabled persons is unconstitutional); see, e.g., Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. 
Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (holding that excessive fines are unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 19 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (emphasizing the importance of human dignity in 
assessing an Eighth Amendment claim). See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of 
Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011) (discussing how concepts of dignity inform constitutional 
jurisprudence). 
 20 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958) (plurality opinion) (discussing with disapprov-
al punishments that inflict extreme physical or emotional pain and dehumanize individuals). The Su-
preme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment’s scope is “not static.” Id. at 100–01. Lower courts 
have echoed these sentiments. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (empha-
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Amendment is not limited to prohibiting torture or punishments inflicting 
physical pain.21 Rather, the Supreme Court has broadly applied it to forbid 
punishments that are more psychological in nature as well.22 
In 1976, in Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court first considered the de-
nial of medical care vis-à-vis the Eighth Amendment and held that the gov-
ernment must provide medical care to address the serious medical needs of 
incarcerated persons.23 Failure to do so, the Court reasoned, could result in 
needless pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment.24 Specifi-
cally, Estelle gave rise to a “deliberate indifference” framework for incarcer-
ated plaintiffs contesting the denial of medical care.25 The deliberate indiffer-
ence framework is a two-prong test.26 Plaintiffs must allege (1) a serious medi-
cal need, and (2) that prison officials who were both aware of that need and 
capable of addressing it did not do so.27 Plaintiffs demonstrate the first prong, 
serious medical need, by showing that unnecessary pain will result from either 
no medical treatment or substandard medical treatment.28 After satisfying the 
                                                                                                                           
sizing dignity and flexible standards of decency). See generally Dennis J. Baker, Constitutionalizing 
the Harm Principle, 27 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 10 (2008) (drawing parallels between evolving Eighth 
Amendment standards and the evolving scope of rights protected under other amendments). 
 21 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96 (1991) (holding that disproportionately long 
prison sentences are unconstitutional); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (holding that denaturalization is an un-
constitutional punishment, regardless of its nonphysical nature). 
 22 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102 (discussing the profound negative psychological impact of denatural-
ization). In 1958, in Trop v. Dulles, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically struck down 
revocation of citizenship as a form of punishment. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court has also found 
that sentences disproportionate to the crimes committed can be unconstitutional in some instances. 
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995–96 (holding that a life sentence for a drug possession charge was unconsti-
tutionally harsh); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (same). Beyond intentionally inflicted 
punishment, the Supreme Court has also used the Eighth Amendment to assess prison conditions. 
Brown, 563 U.S. at 544–45. The Supreme Court held that an overcrowded prison was just as serious 
of an Eighth Amendment violation as the denial of medical care. Id. at 525. In both instances, prison 
officials’ actions caused needless suffering to prisoners. Id. 
 23 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (noting that incarcerated persons are unable to 
provide for some of their own needs and must rely on prison authorities to do so). 
 24 Id. at 104, 106. 
 25 Id. at 106. 
 26 Id. The Supreme Court has used the “deliberate indifference” nomenclature in a variety of 
other contexts, from prison conditions to institutional liability for sexual harassment. See, e.g., Davis 
v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (using the deliberate indifference framework 
to assess a school’s response to a student’s allegations of sexual harassment). 
 27 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (setting forth both prongs of the deliberate indifference test); 
Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (reaffirming and applying the two 
prongs of the Estelle test). 
 28 See, e.g., Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a prison was liable 
to an inmate who was not seen by physicians for a thumb fracture for several months following an 
injury). There is no strict definition of what constitutes “substandard” medical treatment; rather, this is 
a fact-dependent analysis for which courts will rely on expert testimony and medical records, among 
other things. See Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 495–97 (recounting expert testimony that discussed the plain-
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first prong, the plaintiff must then show that prison officials did not adequately 
respond to that serious medical need.29 This requires reckless disregard for a 
prisoner’s health.30 In other words, plaintiffs must show prison officials either 
did not provide necessary treatment, intentionally pursued a medically unac-
ceptable course of treatment, or consciously disregarded the risk of inadequate 
treatment.31 
Because courts are loath to opine on medical matters, they generally turn to 
accepted standards of care in the medical community for guidance on minimum 
adequate treatment.32 For example, courts deciding Eighth Amendment medical 
care claims regularly cite the standards of care promulgated by the National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC), although these standards 
                                                                                                                           
tiff’s medical condition and the prescribed treatment protocols); Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (using the 
plaintiff’s medical records to determine the quality of care necessary for the plaintiff’s condition). 
 29 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (establishing the deliberate indifference test for adjudicating claims 
regarding the adequacy of medical care in prisons); Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 497 (explaining the state of 
mind that constitutes deliberate indifference). 
 30 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). The Supreme Court explicitly stated that an 
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim utilizes a standard far higher than “a lack of ordinary 
due care.” Id. (quoting Whitney v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). Recklessness is generally de-
fined as the creation of a significant risk of harm to others and a disregard of that risk. Reckless, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Similarly, disregard occurs where an entity ignores 
something or does not treat it with proper respect or consideration. Disregard, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra. 
 31 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–36. The Supreme Court’s 1994 opinion in Farmer v. Brennan sur-
veyed cases across federal courts that roughly equated deliberate indifference with recklessness. Id. at 
836; see, e.g., LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993) (“To be deliberately indiffer-
ent, a prison official must knowingly or recklessly disregard an inmate’s basic needs . . . .”). As part of 
the second element, the plaintiff must also suffer some harm as a result of the prison officials’ disre-
gard of a serious medical need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (holding that the denial of medical care must 
result in “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 
(1976))). A risk of future harm also qualifies under this framework. Roe v. Elyea, 831 F.3d 843, 858 
(7th Cir. 2011) (citing Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2005)). This is especially true if 
there is an unreasonably great risk to future health. Id.; Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2043, 2044 
(2015); Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 788 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
610 (2020). Examples of risk to future health include the possibility of a condition worsening or a risk 
of self-harm resulting from pain and suffering. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 788; Roe, 831 F.3d at 858. The 
Estelle deliberate indifference test is applied in a varied number of contexts, even including the provi-
sion of personal hygiene or menstrual health products. See Mitchell O. Carney, Note, Cycles of Pun-
ishment: The Constitutionality of Restricting Access to Menstrual Health Products in Prisons, 61 B.C. 
L. REV. 2541, 2560–68, 2588–93 (2020) (discussing Eighth Amendment denial of medical care juris-
prudence and its applicability to personal hygiene and the provision of menstrual health products). 
 32 See, e.g., Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2043, 2044 (assessing an Eighth Amendment claim against 
widely accepted correctional psychiatric care standards); Bragg v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1226–
27 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (assessing prison psychiatric care against National Commission on Correctional 
Health Care (NCCHC) standards); Feliciano v. Gonzalez, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 n.3 (D.P.R. 1998) 
(discussing NCCHC standards and accreditations when assessing prison medical and mental health 
care systems); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1483–84 (D. Ariz. 1993) (discussing NCCHC 
standards with regard to psychiatric, medical, and dental care, as well as other professional standards 
from other organizations). 
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are not necessarily determinative.33 Additionally, federal courts considering the 
provision of GCS under the Estelle framework almost invariably refer to the 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s Standards of Care for 
the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People 
(WPATH-SOC).34 The WPATH-SOC is a set of clinical recommendations for 
persons transitioning genders that the NCCHC has supported and adopted.35 
B. Factual and Procedural Background of Edmo 
Adree Edmo is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Cor-
rections (IDOC) since 2012.36 She has identified as female from a young age.37 
At all times in IDOC custody, Edmo has lived openly as female.38 Shortly after 
her incarceration began, a prison psychiatrist diagnosed Edmo with “gender 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See, e.g., Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., No. 181-CV-1165-BLW, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
95915, at *28 (D. Idaho May 30, 2020) (discussing NCCHC standards of psychiatric care). The 
NCCHC is an independent, non-profit organization that seeks to improve the quality of healthcare in 
correctional facilities. About Us, NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, https://www.ncchc.org/
about [https://perma.cc/6269-DWE3]. Although NCCHC standards are instructive and help courts 
determine the adequacy of the care provided, they do not by themselves establish the minimum level 
of adequate care. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n.27 (1979). Conversely, it is also possible that 
even though a certain medical treatment is NCCHC-approved, it could still be unconstitutionally inad-
equate under the Eighth Amendment. See id. (asserting that NCCHC standards have no bearing on the 
adequacy of treatment in an Eighth Amendment analysis). 
 34 See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek III), 774 F.3d 63, 70 n.3 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc) (rely-
ing on the WPATH-SOC to assess the adequacy of medical care given to an incarcerated transgender 
woman). 
 35 Id. Prior to 2011, the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) was 
known as the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, and the Standards of Care 
document was instead tilted “Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders.” Id. This Comment, when 
discussing the WPATH Standards of Care, refers to the seventh version of the document, published in 
2011. See generally THE WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STAND-
ARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING 
PEOPLE (2011) [hereinafter “WPATH-SOC”] (outlining clinical care recommendations for transgender 
and gender nonconforming people, including recommendations for the treatment of gender dyspho-
ria). The WPATH-SOC is a set of “flexible clinical guidelines.” Id. at 2. These guidelines are meant to 
provide clinicians with a comprehensive overview of the unique healthcare needs of transgender per-
sons, including gender transition recommendations and specialized reproductive and mental health 
guidelines. Id. at 1. The WPATH-SOC also cautions against viewing transgender people or people 
with gender dysphoria solely in a medical context. Id. at 4–5; see Agbemenu, supra note 6 (cautioning 
against viewing transgender issues in a solely medical framework). The NCCHC has adopted and 
accepted the WPATH-SOC treatment recommendations. NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, 
STANDARDS OF HEALTH SERVICES IN PRISONS (2018); see supra note 33 and accompany text 
(providing an overview of the NCCHC).  
 36 Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1116 (D. Idaho 2018). 
 37 Id. Edmo, aged thirty at the time of writing, testified during the district court proceedings that 
she has identified as female since at least age five or six. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 772 
(9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020). She began openly living as a woman 
at approximately age twenty, shortly before her incarceration. Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1116. 
 38 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 772. Edmo has presented as female in her manner of dress and hairstyle since 
at least 2012. Id. 
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identity disorder,” now known as gender dysphoria.39 Afterwards, Edmo began 
socially transitioning genders, changing her name and sex on her birth certifi-
cate.40 Prison officials later prescribed her hormone therapy, which somewhat 
ameliorated her gender dysphoria.41 Edmo, however, continued to suffer dis-
tress due to her embarrassment at having male genitalia.42 
Edmo twice attempted self-castration, emphasizing “emotional torment” 
as a driving factor behind the attempts.43 Dr. Scott Eliason, a prison psychia-
trist who made Edmo’s initial diagnosis, evaluated Edmo for GCS prior to the 
second self-castration attempt.44 Despite Edmo’s severe gender dysphoria, Dr. 
Eliason did not recommend GCS.45 Instead, he concluded that hormone treat-
ment and counseling would be sufficient.46 Dr. Eliason testified that he con-
sulted the WPATH-SOC in making his recommendations.47 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. Gender dysphoria is defined as feelings of anxiety stemming from incongruence between the 
gender a person is assigned at birth and the gender with which that person identifies, subjectively experi-
ences, and objectively expresses. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 452–53, 458 (5th ed. 2013). The American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
had used the term “gender identity disorder” in prior versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manu-
al of Mental Disorders (DSM). Id. at 451. The APA elected to change the term to “gender dysphoria,” 
however, to reduce stigma around accessing gender-affirming care. Id. Doctors vary in their specific 
methods of treating gender dysphoria but focus generally on facilitating social and medical transition. 
Id. at 454–56. The DSM distinguishes between gender nonconformity (behavior or expression that 
does not match with historical gender roles) and gender dysphoria. Id. at 451. 
 40 Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1117. Social acclimation includes adopting mannerisms, styles of 
dress, etc., associated with the gender with which a person identifies, as well as legal name changes. 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 39, at 455. Medical transitioning, on the other hand, includes 
undergoing hormone treatment or GCS. Id. 
 41 Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1117. Hormone therapy involves taking hormones to induce physical 
changes in one’s body to match one’s gender identity. Feminizing Hormone Therapy, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/feminizing-hormone-therapy/about/pac-20385096 
[https://perma.cc/2236-AJKU]. At the time of her lawsuit, Edmo was “hormonally confirmed,” mean-
ing that her hormones and some sex characteristics matched those of a person assigned female at birth. 
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 772. Without further care, however, she would not experience further physical 
change. Id. 
 42 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 773. In discussions with prison clinicians and mental health providers, Ed-
mo repeatedly reported ideation of self-castration. Id. at 773 n.8. 
 43 Id. at 773–74. Edmo had written notes just prior to both attempts in which she discussed her 
desperation to “help [her]self.” Id. at 774. Edmo did not complete the castration on either attempt, but 
she continued to report ideation of another attempt in subsequent counseling sessions. Id. 
 44 Id. at 773–74. 
 45 Id. at 774. 
 46 Id. at 773–74. At least three other prison clinicians agreed with Dr. Eliason, but the record 
lacked evidence to indicate whether these three clinicians had ever treated a person with gender dys-
phoria. Id. IDOC’s Management and Treatment Committee, a group of medical providers, mental 
health care providers, and prison officials who address the needs of incarcerated persons with gender 
dysphoria, also agreed with Dr. Eliason’s assessment. Id. at 774. 
 47 Id. Dr. Eliason also testified to his opinion that Edmo would not be a suitable candidate for 
GCS until Edmo had better addressed her depression and substance abuse issues. Id. The court noted 
Eliason’s clinical notes apparently contradicted his testimony but did not discuss exactly how. Edmo 
v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1119 (D. Idaho 2018). 
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In April 2017, Edmo filed a pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Idaho, seeking an injunction.48 In her complaint, Edmo asserted 
an Eighth Amendment violation.49 In considering Edmo’s claim, the district 
court collected testimony from seven witnesses and thousands of pages of 
medical records, depositions, and declarations.50 The court also looked for 
medical guidelines against which to assess Edmo’s circumstances and found 
that the WPATH-SOC was the leading authority on medical care for 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 775. Edmo’s lawsuit named the IDOC and several of its employees as de-
fendants. Id. Corizon was added as a defendant because Corizon contracts with the IDOC to provide 
healthcare. Id. Corizon is a privately held prison healthcare contractor that works with approximately 
220 jails and prisons in 17 states. About, CORIZON HEALTH, http://www.corizonhealth.com/About-
Corizon/Locations [https://perma.cc/6NQV-J6HQ]. A pro se litigant is one who represents oneself 
without the assistance of a lawyer. Pro se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30. Injunctions, or 
“prohibitory injunctions,” are court orders that prevent a party from doing something. Injunction, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30. Affirmative injunctions, or “mandatory injunctions,” are 
orders that compel a party to do something. Id. The word “injunction” refers to either type. Id. Edmo 
sought an affirmative injunction to compel IDOC to provide her GCS. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 775. Federal 
courts grant injunctions when a plaintiff demonstrates (1) the possibility of succeeding on the merits 
of a legal claim, (2) an irreparable injury, (3) that legal remedies or monetary compensation are inade-
quate, (4) the injunction would not be overly burdensome on the defendant, and (5) the injunction is 
compatible with the public interest. eBay Inc. v. MercExch. L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Edmo, 
935 F.3d at 784. 
 49 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 775. In addition, Edmo asserted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Id. At bottom, these claims 
alleged that the IDOC’s denial of GCS constituted discrimination and, therefore, violated constitu-
tional and statutory civil rights protections. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (providing for equal protec-
tion under the law); 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in the provision 
of healthcare); 45 C.F.R. § 92.1 (2020) (prohibiting discrimination the basis of disability in the provi-
sion of healthcare). 
 50 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 775. Two of Edmo’s treating IDOC clinicians testified to Edmo’s medical 
circumstances. Id. Edmo also testified on her own behalf. Id. Additionally, Edmo and the State of 
Idaho each retained two expert witnesses. Id. Edmo’s first expert witness was Dr. Randi Ettner, Ph.D., 
one of the authors of the WPATH-SOC. Id. at 775–76. The Ninth Circuit recounted Dr. Ettner’s sub-
stantial credentials in the area of transgender healthcare and the treatment of gender dysphoria. Id.; see 
Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (discussing Dr. Ettner’s experience working with over 3,000 persons 
with gender dysphoria and her research on transgender healthcare). Edmo’s second expert witness was 
Dr. Ryan Gorton, M.D., an emergency medicine physician who had worked with hundreds of persons 
with gender dysphoria and was also involved with WPATH. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 777. Both Doctors 
Ettner and Gorton testified that Edmo was eligible for and required GCS because without it, her gen-
der dysphoria would worsen and could lead to adverse effects like continued attempts at self-harm. Id. 
at 775–77. The State of Idaho retained Dr. Keelin Garvey, M.D., C.C.H.P., former Chief Psychiatrist 
for the Massachusetts Department of Corrections and chair of the Gender Dysphoria Treatment Com-
mittee. Id. at 777. Dr. Garvey had limited experience addressing gender dysphoria. Id. The State also 
retained Dr. Joel Andrade, PhD, C.C.H.P., who had worked with Dr. Garvey on the Gender Dysphoria 
Treatment Committee and had over ten years of experience in correctional mental health, but not 
gender dysphoria. Id. at 779. Doctors Garvey and Andrade did not believe Edmo required GCS. Id. at 
777–79. They both believed Edmo’s gender dysphoria was not serious enough to warrant GCS and 
that Edmo’s hormone therapy was sufficient to mitigate her gender dysphoria. Id. 
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transgender persons.51 According to the court, the WPATH-SOC reliably indi-
cated the constitutional minimum for adequate medical care.52 
First, the court found Edmo’s gender dysphoria constituted a serious med-
ical need under the first prong of the Estelle test.53 The key issue, however, 
was the second prong—whether IDOC, in denying GCS to Edmo, had strayed 
too far from the WPATH-SOC’s guidelines.54 Edmo had several witnesses, all 
of whom had significant experience working with gender dysphoria, testify in 
support of the notion that IDOC’s refusal to provide GCS was inappropriate in 
Edmo’s circumstances.55 Given those witnesses’ experience, the district court 
gave great weight to their testimony.56 Accordingly, the district court ruled in 
Edmo’s favor on the grounds that IDOC’s denial of GCS constituted inade-
quate care.57 IDOC thus exhibited deliberate indifference to Edmo’s serious 
medical need, failing the second Estelle prong.58 
The State of Idaho appealed.59 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s grant of an injunction on the grounds that Edmo had proven her Eighth 
Amendment claim.60 The court reasoned that Edmo would suffer irreparable 
injury without an injunction and that IDOC’s evidence did not credibly rebut 
that notion.61 The Ninth Circuit denied a request for an en banc rehearing.62 
The State of Idaho appealed again, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari.63 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1112, 1126–27 (calling the WPATH-SOC “recognized standards of 
care”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 1118–19. 
 54 Id. at 1124. 
 55 Id. at 1125. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 1129. Because the State of Idaho’s witnesses were less, or not at all, experienced in the 
area of healthcare for transgender persons, the district court gave less weight to their testimony. Id. at 
1125–26. Edmo’s complaint sought a preliminary injunction, but the district court expressed concern 
that Edmo’s request for GCS created a situation where it was only possible to grant a final, permanent 
injunction. Id. at 1122 n.1. Given no objection from either party, the district court granted a final, 
permanent injunction. Id. at 1122 n.1, 1129. 
 58 Id. at 1128–29. 
 59 Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 781 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
610 (2020). In its appeal, the State also raised a number of other concerns. Id. at 782–84, 800. The 
State contended that the district court’s injunction was overly broad both in terms of the relief it 
sought and the parties it bound, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed. Id. at 782. Additionally, the State 
believed that the district court violated its right to a fair jury trial. Id. at 800–03. The Ninth Circuit 
rejected this concern as well, noting that the State had explicitly agreed to an evidentiary hearing de-
cided only by a judge, rather than a full jury trial. Id. Thus, as the main issue on appeal, Edmo’s 
Eighth Amendment claim received the bulk of the Ninth Circuit’s attention. Id. at 785–86. 
 60 Id. at 803. Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit ruled on Edmo’s Fourteenth Amend-
ment or ACA claims because she prevailed on her Eighth Amendment claim. See id. (failing to dis-
cuss either the Fourteenth Amendment or the ACA claims); Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1128–29 (de-
clining to rule on the Fourteenth Amendment or ACA claims). 
 61 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 803. Ninth Circuit precedent mandates affording district courts “considera-
ble deference in [their] determination[s] that witnesses were qualified to draw [their] conclusions.” Id. 
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II. THE J.D.S AND THE M.D.S SPAR OVER STANDARDS OF CARE  
FOR INCARCERATED TRANSGENDER PERSONS 
The issue of a prison’s denial of GCS to an incarcerated transgender per-
son first appeared in federal courts in 2002.64 Since then, three federal circuit 
courts have considered the issue.65 Section A of this Part explains the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s 2014 holding in Kosilek v. Spencer that 
                                                                                                                           
at 788 (citing Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2002)). An irreparable injury is one 
that cannot be measured or compensated with money damages. Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 30. 
 62 Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 949 F.3d 489, 490 (9th Cir. 2020). Judges Daniel Collins and Patrick 
Bumatay dissented from the denial. Id. at 505 (Collins, J., dissenting); id. at 508 (Bumatay, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Collins believed the court had erroneously applied the lower legal standard of negligence 
when it should have applied the approximate reckless disregard standard for deliberate indifference. 
Id. at 505 (Collins, J., dissenting). Judge Bumatay, on the other hand, argued in favor of a literal read-
ing of the word “unusual” which would imply that, without a longstanding practice of providing GCS 
in prisons, it could not be cruel and unusual to deny it. Id. at 508 (Bumatay, J., dissenting). Judge 
Diarmuid O’Scannlain filed an opinion criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s denial of a rehearing. Id. at 490 
(noting that Judge O’Scannlain is a senior judge and thus cannot formally join dissenting opinions). 
Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion echoed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 2019 decision in 
Gibson v. Collier, contending that the WPATH-SOC was not an authoritative standard of care. Id. at 
497; see 920 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir.) (questioning the validity of the WPATH-SOC), cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 653 (2019). 
 63 Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 141 S. Ct. 610, 610 (2020). The Supreme Court had also denied 
the State of Idaho’s request to stay the Ninth Circuit ruling. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 S. Ct. 
2800, 2800 (2020). A stay suspends a judgment or judicial proceeding, and a stay in Edmo’s case 
would have halted her access to GCS until the Supreme Court decided the issue. See stay, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30 (explaining the effect of a stay on a judgment). 
 64 Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that severe 
gender dysphoria entitled the plaintiff to access gender-affirming care while incarcerated). 
 65 See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 803 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (discussing the issue 
of providing GCS to an incarcerated person), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020); Gibson v. Collier, 
920 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 653 (2019); Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek 
III), 774 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc) (same). These cases are sometimes categorized as 
“Farmer challenges,” referring to the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Farmer v. Brennan. See 511 
U.S. 825, 849 (1994) (setting forth the deliberate indifference test with regard to incarcerated 
transgender persons); see, e.g., Judson Adams et al., Transgender Rights and Issues, 21 GEO. J. GEN-
DER & L. 479, 518 (2020) (discussing Farmer challenges in prison systems). Farmer dealt with an 
Eighth Amendment claim by Dee Farmer, a transgender woman in a federal prison. 511 U.S. at 829. 
The claim centered on whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent to Farmer’s safety when 
housing her in the male general population facility, where other prisoners beat and sexually assaulted 
her. Id. The Court held that the prison exhibited deliberate indifference to Farmer’s safety by housing 
her in male general population. Id. at 849. The Farmer holding helped articulate the second prong of 
the Estelle v. Gamble deliberate indifference test. See id. at 835–36; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
106 (1976) (setting forth the two-prong deliberate indifference test). Farmer does not, however, speak 
directly to issues of the provision of gender-affirming care. See 511 U.S. at 849 (failing to discuss 
gender-affirming care). Oftentimes, Eighth Amendment claims by incarcerated LGBTQ+ persons, 
whether or not medical care is involved in the claim, draw on Farmer and its related precedent. See, 
e.g., Sonja Marrett, Note, Beyond Rehabilitation: Constitutional Violations Associated with the Isola-
tion and Discrimination of Transgender Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, 58 B.C. L. REV. 351, 
358–59 (2017) (discussing Farmer in the context of juvenile detention issues for LGBTQ+ youth).  
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denying GCS was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment in this particu-
lar plaintiff’s instance.66 Section B describes a subsequent U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit ruling in Gibson v. Collier that denying GCS in pris-
ons can never be unconstitutional.67 Finally, Section C explains the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., in which 
the court held that the weight of medical evidence supported the assertion that 
denial of GCS was unconstitutional in Edmo’s case.68 
A. First Impression in the First Circuit: Kosilek v. Spencer 
In 2014, the First Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to apply the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1976 Estelle v. Gamble framework in the context of 
GCS.69 Kosilek, however, was by no means the start of the legal journey of 
Michelle Kosilek, a prisoner in the custody of the Massachusetts Department 
of Corrections (MDOC).70 In Kosilek v. Maloney, her first lawsuit against 
MDOC in 2002, Kosilek alleged an Eighth Amendment violation on the 
grounds that she had received no treatment for her gender dysphoria.71 MDOC 
clinicians diagnosed Kosilek with gender dysphoria while in custody after she 
had attempted self-castration.72 The U.S. District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts held that, although Kosilek had a serious medical need, the MDOC 
did not act with deliberate indifference because key decision-makers lacked the 
information necessary to comprehend either the extent of Kosilek’s needs 
stemming from her gender dysphoria or that gender-affirming care would ad-
                                                                                                                           
 66 See infra notes 69–87 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 88–108 and accompanying text. 
 68 See infra notes 109–123 and accompanying text. 
 69 See Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 68 (discussing the plaintiff’s access to GCS in prison under the 
Eighth Amendment framework). See generally Hana Church, Comment, Prisoner Denied Sex Reas-
signment Surgery: The First Circuit Ignores Medical Consensus in Kosilek v. Spencer, 57 B.C. L. 
REV. E. SUPP. 17 (2016), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol57/iss6/2 [https://perma.cc/8X5W-
TK4B] (providing an in-depth analysis of the Kosilek decision).  
 70 See Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d en banc, 
774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (discussing the plaintiff’s lawsuit against prison authority for the denial of 
GCS); Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D. Mass. 2002) (discussing the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit against prison authority for the denial of other gender-affirming care). 
 71 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159. Kosilek was incarcerated in 1990, and she filed her first 
lawsuit two years later. Id. Kosilek had attempted suicide and self-castration while in custody. Id. at 
164. Kosilek socially transitioned to a limited extent both before and during her incarceration. Id. at 
164–65. MDOC denied Kosilek’s request for medical transition resources. Id. In subsequent counsel-
ing sessions, Kosilek expressed ideation around self-harm, which she testified to at trial. Id. at 165. 
Prior to the initiation of Kosilek’s lawsuit, MDOC had requested psychiatric and medical assessments 
from in-house clinicians, as well as external physicians specializing in transgender healthcare. Id. at 
166, 168–70. 
 72 Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 69–71. 
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dress her gender dysphoria.73 The court noted, however, that its opinion effec-
tively put the MDOC on notice.74 Afterwards, MDOC afforded Kosilek some 
gender-affirming care but not GCS.75 
Kosilek’s access to GCS became the focus of another Eighth Amendment 
lawsuit when, in 2006, she sued the MDOC again.76 The district court again 
found in her favor, holding that the MDOC’s denial of GCS was unconstitution-
al.77 The MDOC appealed, and, in 2014, the First Circuit upheld the judgment.78 
The First Circuit later reheard the case en banc.79 The en banc court held 
that Kosilek’s gender dysphoria was a serious medical need, thereby meeting 
the first Estelle prong.80 Kosilek failed, however, to meet the second Estelle 
prong.81 The First Circuit concluded that the WPATH-SOC was widely accept-
ed as providing authoritative standards of care for gender dysphoria.82 The 
court determined, however, that the treatment afforded to Kosilek did not un-
acceptably deviate from the WPATH-SOC.83 Therefore, even though the treat-
ment provided was not the treatment Kosilek requested, it did not fall below 
acceptable standards.84 Stated another way, the provision of gender-affirming 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 162. The court held that Michael Maloney, then Commissioner of 
MDOC, was not qualified to make medical decisions for Kosilek. Id. at 161–62. MDOC had never 
had a person with gender dysphoria in its custody. Id. Maloney had stepped in to manage Kosilek’s 
case given the sensitivity of the matter and the lack of experience of MDOC staff. Id. Maloney adopt-
ed a “rigid freeze-frame policy” that did not provide gender-affirming treatment beyond what inmates 
had been provided prior to incarceration. Id. The court found Maloney’s impetus for doing so was not 
rooted in a desire to inflict pain or deny care. Id. at 162. 
 74 Id. at 162. Being “on notice” means having certain knowledge with binding legal implications. 
Charged with notice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30. 
 75 Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 69–71. MDOC provided Kosilek with hormone treatment, as well as 
feminine clothing and personal effects, to begin her transition. Id. at 69–70. Pursuit of GCS would not 
come until later in her transition process. Id.  
 76 Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d en banc, 774 
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 77 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 197. Similar to the courts’ rationale in Kosilek’s earlier lawsuits, 
the court found that, without access to further gender-affirming care, specifically GCS, Kosilek would 
face irreparable injury in the form of continued mental torment and anguish from her gender dyspho-
ria. Id. 
 78 Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 79 Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 68. MDOC filed a motion to have the case reheard en banc. Id. 
 80 Id. at 86; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (holding that a plaintiff suing under 
an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim must show a serious medical need). 
 81 Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 91–92 (holding that prison officials were not equipped with sufficient 
knowledge to infer that Kosilek’s medical care was constitutionally inadequate). 
 82 Id. The First Circuit did not go as far as calling the WPATH-SOC medical consensus but nev-
ertheless concluded that the WPATH-SOC was informative and authoritative. Id. 
 83 Id.; see supra note 35 and accompanying text (providing an explanation of the WPATH-SOC). 
 84 Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 91–92. The court also held Kosilek failed to meet the second Estelle 
prong because the MDOC believed providing Kosilek with GCS would create safety and security 
concerns, especially around housing, like those outlined in Farmer v. Brennan. Id. at 95–96; see 511 
U.S. 825, 830 (1994) (discussing safety concerns around housing an incarcerated transgender woman 
in male general population). For example, the MDOC believed Kosilek would be at risk of being 
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care excluding GCS was, according to professional medical guidelines, suffi-
cient to mitigate Kosilek’s gender dysphoria.85 The First Circuit explicitly not-
ed its decision did not condone blanket bans on GCS in prisons.86 A blanket 
ban would not be acceptable under the Estelle framework, the court held, be-
cause blanket bans necessarily discount individual medical needs.87 
B. The Fifth Circuit Also Denied GCS in Gibson v. Collier 
In 2019, the Fifth Circuit faced a similar set of facts in Gibson v. Colli-
er.88 There, prison physicians diagnosed Vanessa Lynn Gibson89 with gender 
dysphoria while she was in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice (TDCJ).90 Prison healthcare providers began a regimen of counseling 
and hormone treatment.91 Gibson submitted a request for GCS, but TDCJ de-
                                                                                                                           
assaulted if housed in male general population after receiving GCS. Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 79. In 
addition, the superintendent of a women’s prison stated that Kosilek’s history of domestic abuse and 
murder would create security risks in female general population. Id. at 80. Thus, the court held that the 
MDOC had reasons other than the deliberate intention to inflict pain in denying GCS. Id. at 96. The 
Supreme Court denied Kosilek’s appeal. Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059, 2059 (2015). 
 85 Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 96. The Kosilek decision ostensibly turned on the testimony of one 
expert witness who disagreed with the WPATH-SOC’s recommendations. Id.; Church, supra note 69, 
at 30. 
 86 Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 90–91. 
 87 Id. (citing Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2011)); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (setting forth the deliberate indifference test with regard to an individual plain-
tiff’s serious medical needs). Judge O. Rogeiree Thompson dissented, criticizing the majority’s deci-
sion both for the standard of review it applied, the manner in which it applied law to fact, and the 
ultimate conclusion. Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 98, 101 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Judge William 
Kayatta dissented as well, criticizing the majority for usurping the district court’s fact-finding mission. 
Id. at 113–15 (Kayatta, J., dissenting). 
 88 Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir.) (holding that the denial of GCS was not uncon-
stitutional), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 653 (2019). 
 89 The opinion refers to Gibson using masculine pronouns and a masculine name. Id. at 217 n.2. 
Although this was purportedly done to be consistent with prison policy, other courts refer to transgender 
plaintiffs with their chosen pronouns. See, e.g., Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 
2019) (per curiam) (using feminine pronouns for a transgender woman plaintiff), cert. denied, 141 
S. Ct. 610 (2020). The practice of using the name and pronouns assigned to a transgender person at 
birth is known as “deadnaming” and is considered to be an aggressive and improper rejection of 
someone’s gender identity. Julia Sinclair-Palm, “It’s Non-Existent”: Haunting in Trans Youth Narra-
tives About Naming, 37 OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 96, 100 (2017). Additionally, deadnaming is 
known to exacerbate gender dysphoria. See M. Paz Galupo & Lex Pulice-Farrow, “Every Time I Get 
Gendered Male, I Feel a Pain in My Chest”: Understanding the Social Context for Gender Dyspho-
ria, 5 STIGMA & HEALTH 199, 202 (2020) (describing the adverse psychological effects of deadnam-
ing). Judge Walter Smith, Jr., who presided over Gibson’s district court proceedings, used feminine 
pronouns. See Gibson v. Livingston, No. W-15-CA-190, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195724, at *2–4 
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2016). 
 90 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 217. Gibson underwent a psychiatric assessment after claiming ideation of 
self-harm. Id. Like Kosilek and Edmo, Gibson had attempted self-castration. See id. (describing the 
plaintiff’s self-castration attempt); see also Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767 (describing Edmo’s two attempts); 
Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 69 (describing Kosilek’s multiple attempts). 
 91 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 217. 
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nied it, saying the provision of GCS was inconsistent with policy.92 Gibson 
sued in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.93 Gibson chal-
lenged the prison policy on Eighth Amendment grounds, alleging the policy 
was, in effect, a blanket ban on GCS.94 Gibson lost and then appealed.95 
The Fifth Circuit ultimately ruled in the TDCJ’s favor.96 It agreed that 
gender dysphoria was a serious medical need under the first Estelle prong but 
did not find deliberate indifference under the second.97 The court held that be-
cause disagreement on the efficacy of GCS exists, the WPATH-SOC is not in-
structive on the minimum acceptable level of care.98 Thus, Gibson could not 
rely on the WPATH-SOC to show the denial of GCS constituted inadequate 
medical care.99 The court then expressed disagreement with the efficacy of 
GCS by citing evidence from Kosilek and a memorandum by the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services on the provision of GCS.100 In the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s view, only “universally accepted” standards of care could provide a mini-
mum.101 In sum, the court concluded it was impossible to be deliberately indif-
                                                                                                                           
 92 Id. at 217–18. TDCJ’s policies and medical protocols did not recognize GCS as a treatment 
option for gender dysphoria. Id. Notably, the majority and dissenting opinions in Gibson v. Collier use 
the term “sex reassignment surgery” rather than GCS. Id. at 215; id. at 228 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). 
 93 Gibson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195724, at *2. In this initial litigation, Gibson named Brad 
Livingston, the CEO of the TDCJ at the time, as a defendant. Id. at *1. Bryan Collier took over TDCJ 
as Executive Director by the time Gibson appealed. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 218 (majority opinion). 
 94 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 217–18. 
 95 Id. at 218. A number of procedural issues were discussed at length in both the majority opinion 
and the dissent pertaining to whether the district court properly applied a summary judgment standard 
and the attendant burdens on both parties. Id. at 219; id. at 229 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). The court 
did not rule on these procedural issues, however, as Gibson only appealed the Eighth Amendment 
decision on the merits. Id. at 218 (majority opinion). 
 96 Id. at 218–19. 
 97 Id. at 218; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (holding that an Eighth Amendment 
claim for inadequate medical care must allege deliberate indifference to a serious medical need). 
 98 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 227. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 222, 223 n.7. The cited memo, however, appeared to call for an individualized assess-
ment of the necessity of GCS for Medicare/Medicaid recipients. See Tamara Syrek Jensen et al., Deci-
sion Memo for Gender Dysphoria and Gender Reassignment Surgery, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MED-
ICAID SERVS. (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/nca-
decision-memo.aspx?NCAId=282 [https://perma.cc/5K9D-9JP4] (requiring an individualized assess-
ment of a Medicare and/or Medicaid recipient’s need for GCS). 
 101 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 220, 223–24. Beyond mentioning that the phrase “universally accepted” is 
written in Gibson’s briefs, the opinion does not cite any legal authority using this language. See id. at 
220 (failing to cite to a legal authority on this point). The word “universal” appears only once in 
Kosilek v. Spencer, in a quotation recounting witness testimony. Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek III), 774 
F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc). The word does not appear in this context in any other jurispru-
dence on Eighth Amendment claims of inadequate medical care. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 103 (discussing the minimum standards of care in a general sense); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 
2042, 2043–44 (2015) (accepting NCCHC-approved standards without questioning medical consen-
sus). 
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ferent under the second prong of the Estelle framework unless there was univer-
sal consensus that GCS effectively addressed gender dysphoria.102 
In coming to this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied on its own precedent, 
as well as that of the First Circuit, which held that prisoners’ disagreement with 
healthcare providers is insufficient to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.103 
In addition, the majority opinion, moving outside the Estelle realm altogether, 
performed a textualist analysis of the Eighth Amendment.104 The opinion 
delved into the meaning of the word “unusual.”105 The court essentially ruled 
that, absent a longstanding tradition of providing GCS to prisoners, it can nev-
er be “unusual” to deny GCS to prisoners.106 Through its literal reading of the 
word “unusual,” the majority created an effective blanket ban on GCS in pris-
ons.107 Nowhere in the majority’s analysis was there room for the considera-
tion of an individual prisoner’s circumstances or medical history.108 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 220, 223–24. 
 103 Id.; see Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that incarcerated per-
sons’ medical care need not be “perfectly tailored”); see also United States v. Derbes, 369 F.3d 579, 
583 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[Medical] services need only be on a level reasonably commensurate with mod-
ern medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional standards.”). The Gibson 
opinion gave little attention to evidence refuting the majority’s position. See Gibson, 920 F.3d at 222 
(failing to discuss positive support for the WPATH-SOC). Judge Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale dissented. 
Id. at 229 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). Judge Barksdale’s dissent noted that the court cannot rule on any 
procedural shortcomings from the district court proceedings, given that these issues were not raised on 
appeal. Id. at 229, 233. In the portion of his dissent most germane to the Eighth Amendment issue, he 
criticized the majority’s interpretation of Kosilek. Id. at 233. Judge Barksdale contended that the ma-
jority should have focused on the Estelle test, which mandates an individualized consideration of a 
plaintiff’s medical needs. Id. at 236. In Judge Barksdale’s view, the majority’s focus on evidence from 
the Kosilek record is inappropriate because such evidence does not pertain directly to Gibson’s medi-
cal circumstances. Id. at 235–36. Judge Barksdale also noted that the majority cited no legal precedent 
for its “universal acceptance” standard vis-à-vis medical standards of care. Id. at 235. 
 104 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 226–28 (majority opinion). 
 105 Id. This portion of the opinion sought to return to the literal meaning of “cruel and unusual” in 
the Eighth Amendment. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 106 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 227–28 (“No prison in the United States has ever provided sex reassign-
ment surgery to an inmate. Accordingly, Gibson cannot state a claim for cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the plain text and original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 107 Id. at 224–25, 228. In his dissent, Judge Barksdale was harshly critical of this ultimate hold-
ing. Id. at 229 (Barksdale, J., dissenting). In his view, the majority’s holding ultimately enacted an 
overly broad blanket ban on GCS that the First Circuit explicitly stated it wished to avoid in Kosilek 
III. Id. at 238; see Kosilek III, 774 F.3d at 91 (warning against blanket bans on any medical proce-
dure). 
 108 See Gibson, 920 F.3d at 224 (majority opinion) (“We do not see how evidence of individual 
need would change the result in this case.”). 
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C. Enter Edmo: The Ninth Circuit Tempered the Fifth Circuit 
Less than five months after the Fifth Circuit decided Gibson, the Ninth 
Circuit handed down its Edmo opinion.109 The Ninth Circuit first reiterated 
issues not in dispute: (1) Edmo’s gender dysphoria was a serious medical need, 
(2) the WPATH-SOC was the benchmark for treatment of gender dysphoria, (3) 
GCS effectively addressed gender dysphoria.110 The central issue, therefore, 
was the second Estelle prong: whether denying GCS to Edmo consciously dis-
regarded the risks to her overall health.111 In other words, the court had to de-
cide whether IDOC’s provision of gender-affirming care, which did not include 
GCS, was constitutionally adequate.112 
The Ninth Circuit recounted the district court’s extensive findings of fact 
on Edmo’s medical circumstances and the WPATH-SOC.113 Like the district 
court, the Ninth Circuit noted that Edmo’s witnesses had significant experience 
with gender dysphoria patients.114 These credentialed witnesses had proven 
that the severity of Edmo’s gender dysphoria warranted her undergoing 
GCS.115 IDOC, on the other hand, had reached the medically unacceptable 
conclusion that GCS was not appropriate or necessary for Edmo.116 This 
amounted to a conscious disregard under the second Estelle prong because the 
failure to provide GCS to Edmo would result in her facing continued emotion-
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Gibson, 920 F.3d at 226 (holding that the denial of GCS can never be unconstitutional); 
Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 803 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (criticizing the Gibson deci-
sion), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020). 
 110 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769–71, 785. The opinion recounted thirteen medical associations, includ-
ing the American Medical Association and APA, that recognize the WPATH-SOC as consensus in 
care for patients with gender dysphoria. Id. at 769. 
 111 Id. at 786; Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1109–10 (D. Idaho 2018). 
The parties agreed Edmo’s gender dysphoria was a serious medical need, meeting the first Estelle 
prong. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 785; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating that plaintiffs 
bringing an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim must allege a serious medical need).  
 112 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786. 
 113 Id.; see Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1110–21 (reviewing WPATH-SOC, the expert testimony of 
both parties, and Edmo’s health). 
 114 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 787–90; see Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1125; see also supra note 50 and 
accompanying text (providing a description of the key witnesses in Edmo). The court also noted that 
one of the State of Idaho’s expert witnesses, whose opinions were not compatible with the WPATH-SOC, 
was an “outlier in the field of gender dysphoria.” Edmo, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1125. In a previous case 
focusing on GCS in prisons, this witness had made misleading statements about the WPATH-SOC and 
had fabricated testimony. Id. at 1226 (citing Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1188 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015)). The Ninth Circuit also emphasized that the district court was empowered to discount testi-
mony from IDOC’s less-qualified experts. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 788 (citing Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 
1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2002)). In 2002, in Caro v. Woodford, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that 
neurologists’ opinions regarding the plaintiff’s brain injury should be given the greatest weight. 280 
F.3d at 1253. 
 115 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 787–90. 
 116 See id. at 797 (holding the denial of GCS constituted inadequate medical care because it was 
inconsistent with suggested medical protocol). 
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al distress and torment.117 Thus, the Ninth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, 
held that IDOC officials’ failure to adapt Edmo’s treatment plan to include 
GCS amounted to deliberate indifference.118 
The Ninth Circuit criticized the Fifth Circuit’s opposing conclusion.119 
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit took umbrage with the Fifth Circuit “co-
opt[ing]” the evidentiary record in Kosilek to determine that GCS can never be 
cruel and unusual.120 In addition, the Ninth Circuit took issue with the Fifth 
Circuit’s “incorrect, or at best, outdated” assertion that GCS did not effectively 
address gender dysphoria.121 Finally, the Ninth Circuit criticized the Fifth Cir-
cuit for setting aside Eighth Amendment precedent that mandates evaluating 
courses of treatment in light of an individual prisoner’s circumstances.122 In 
other words, according to the Ninth Circuit, all blanket bans are incompatible 
with the Eighth Amendment because they ignore individual medical needs.123 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED ESTELLE IN EDMO 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rightly criticized the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s approach to healthcare for incarcerated 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id. In other words, IDOC’s assertions that Edmo’s gender dysphoria was not serious enough to 
warrant GCS indicated that IDOC had failed to adequately perceive the severity of her condition. Id. 
 118 Id. at 793. The Ninth Circuit cited a Fourth Circuit case that held that prisons were not immun-
ized against Eighth Amendment claims because they had provided some degree of gender-affirming 
care if the level of care provided was still inadequate to address a serious need. Id. (citing De’Lonta v. 
Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 (4th Cir. 2013)). The Fourth Circuit analogized that a painkiller is not 
sufficient treatment for someone who suffers a serious injury from a fall. De’Lonta, 708 F.3d at 526. 
A per curiam opinion is attributed to the entire panel of judges that heard the case, rather than having 
one judge attributed as the opinion’s author. Per curiam, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30. 
Edmo has since undergone GCS. Dawson, supra note 8. 
 119 Compare Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794–95 (holding that the denial of GCS was unconstitutional), 
with Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 215–16 (5th Cir.) (holding that the denial of GCS is never un-
constitutional), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 653 (2019). The Ninth Circuit noted that the Fifth Circuit’s 
“categorical holding,” in addition to improperly relying on testimony from Kosilek, relied on the 
premise that there was no medical consensus that GCS effectively addressed gender dysphoria, a now-
outdated premise. Id.; see WPATH-SOC supra note 35, at 2 (reviewing various methods of addressing 
gender dysphoria). 
 120 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795–97; see Gibson, 920 F.3d at 215–16 (holding that, absent a longstand-
ing tradition of providing GCS in prisons, the denial of GCS is never unconstitutional). 
 121 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795. 
 122 Id. at 796. To support this point, the Ninth Circuit pointed to cases in the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits that held that denying GCS could give rise to an actionable Eighth Amendment claim. Id. 
(first citing Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1040 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding an internal prison policy 
mandating a blanket GCS ban gave a plaintiff with severe gender dysphoria an actionable claim); and 
then citing Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that state laws that ban 
GCS in prisons also gave plaintiffs an actionable claim)). 
 123 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 796 (reviewing the plaintiff’s specific medical circumstances in her Eighth 
Amendment claim); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (outlining the test used in Edmo). 
The Ninth Circuit declined to rule on Edmo’s Fourteenth Amendment and ACA claims. Edmo, 935 
F.3d at 793. 
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transgender persons.124 The Fifth Circuit’s holding is not compatible with the 
precedent upon which it relied.125 In the future, courts should adopt an individ-
ualized approach to determine the medical necessity of GCS for transgender 
prisoners.126 Specifically, courts should mimic the approach of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Idaho and the Ninth Circuit by relying on estab-
lished and accepted medical authority.127 Section A of this Part discusses how 
the Fifth Circuit departed from Eighth Amendment precedent in Gibson v. Col-
lier.128 Section B argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied Eighth 
Amendment precedent.129 
A. Dictionaries Are Not Medical Authority: The Fifth Circuit  
Missed the Mark on Multiple Fronts 
Circuit courts have refined the Supreme Court’s Estelle v. Gamble test to 
better identify when medical care falls below the constitutional minimum.130 
Specifically, courts defer to accepted standards of medical care.131 The Fifth 
Circuit’s Gibson opinion purports to be an example of judicial restraint from 
making medical judgments.132 Ironically, however, the opinion criticized the 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 227–28 (5th Cir.) (holding that the denial of GCS in 
prisons is not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 653 (2019); Edmo v. Corizon, 935 F.3d 757, 
793–94 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (holding that the denial of GCS is unconstitutional and criticizing 
Gibson), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020). 
 125 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 215–16 (stating that a denial of GCS is never unconstitutional); see 
Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek III), 774 F.3d 63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding that a blanket ban 
of a medical procedure is never constitutional). 
 126 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (setting forth the deliberate indifference test 
for inadequate medical care); Edmo, 935 F.3d at 797 (applying Estelle test to assess whether a prison’s 
denial of GCS was unconstitutional). 
 127 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (holding that medical care in prisons must adequately address 
serious medical needs); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2043–44 (2015) (using clinical care stand-
ards to assess the quality of medical care in a prison setting); Edmo, 935 F.3d at 797 (relying on clini-
cal care recommendations for transgender persons in determining the necessity of GCS). 
 128 See infra notes 130–145 and accompanying text. 
 129 See infra notes 146–157 and accompanying text. 
 130 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (providing the general test for the adequacy of medical care in 
prisons); United States v. Derbes, 369 F.3d 579, 583 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming Estelle but stating that 
prisons are not required to create perfect healthcare plans or provide the best quality care available); 
Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that medical care for incarcerated 
persons need not be “perfectly tailored”). 
 131 Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786 (first citing Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015); and 
then citing Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)). The Edmo court 
cited two cases that emphasized medical standards as a key piece of an Eighth Amendment analysis. 
Id.; see Allard, 779 F.3d at 772 (discussing the opinions of medical experts regarding the medical care 
provided to an incarcerated plaintiff); Henderson, 755 F.3d at 566 (discussing the need for the district 
court to consider expert medical opinion in an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care case). 
 132 Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 225 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 653 (2019). The Fifth 
Circuit stated its belief that the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho “took sides in an on-going 
medical debate.” Id. The Fifth Circuit expressed reluctance to take part in what it saw as an “ongoing 
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WPATH-SOC and medical professionals who utilize it.133 Indeed, Gibson ap-
pears to be the only instance in which a federal court questioned standards of 
care promulgated by medical experts.134 Further review of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence reveals no similar treatment of standards of care in any other 
medical sector.135 Thus, for all its talk of restraint, the Gibson opinion is incon-
sistent in practice.136 By discounting the WPATH-SOC, the Fifth Circuit had 
no guidepost to assess of the adequacy of the care afforded to Gibson.137 
In addition, the Fifth Circuit improperly departed from the Estelle test 
when it explicitly stated that individual circumstances have no bearing on 
Eighth Amendment claims for GCS.138 The Fifth Circuit attempted to orient its 
holding on an irrelevant etymological analysis of the word “unusual” in the 
Eighth Amendment.139 In doing so, the court ignored the established Estelle 
test in favor of an exercise in literal interpretation of constitutional text.140 The 
Supreme Court did not articulate a test that asked what the “usual” procedure 
is in response to a given medical need.141 Instead, it asked whether a serious 
                                                                                                                           
medical debate over the medical necessity or efficacy of sex reassignment surgery, other than to 
acknowledge the existence and vigor of that debate.” Id. at 216 n.1. 
 133 See id. at 221–22 (“[L]ater versions of the WPATH were driven by political considerations.”). 
 134 See id. at 221, 223 (questioning the validity of the WPATH-SOC); Kosilek v. Spencer 
(Kosilek III), 774 F.3d 63, 77–78 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc) (accepting the WPATH-SOC despite some 
misgivings); see also Bragg v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1226–27 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (relying on 
NCCHC standards to assess a prison’s psychiatric care programs); Feliciano v. Gonzalez, 13 
F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 n.3 (D.P.R. 1998) (assessing prison medical and psychiatric care against 
NCCHC standards); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1483–84 (D. Ariz. 1993) (using standards 
from NCCHC and other medical organizations to evaluate a prison’s medical, psychiatric, and dental 
care programs). 
 135 See, e.g., Allah v. Thomas, 679 F. App’x 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that prison medical 
staff violated the Eighth Amendment when it did not consider the efficacy and adequacy of treatment 
and instead considered only the cost and the convenience of a treatment plan); Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 
843, 860 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing the importance of following accepted medical protocol in en-
suring adequate care); Berry v. Peterman, 604, F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that prison 
officials cannot default to a certain course of treatment for no reason); Collingon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 
163 F.3d 982, 989 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the Estelle tests looks for a departure from competent 
professional judgment).  
 136 See Gibson, 920 F.3d at 220 (questioning the validity of the WPATH-SOC). 
 137 See id. at 220–22 (stating no acceptable medical standards exist vis-à-vis addressing gender 
dysphoria). 
 138 Id. at 224 (holding that a plaintiff’s individual needs have no bearing on the outcome of an 
Eighth Amendment lawsuit). 
 139 See id. at 226 (analyzing whether a course of medical treatment was literally “unusual”); see 
also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (prescribing the specific framework for evaluating 
claims of inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment without regard to whether a course of 
treatment is “unusual”). 
 140 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (failing to discuss whether the denial of a medical procedure must 
be “unusual” to be unconstitutional); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 226 (holding that the denial of GCS can 
never be unconstitutional because it is not “unusual”). 
 141 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (creating the deliberate indifference test for inadequate medical 
care claims without referencing whether courses of treatment are “unusual”). 
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medical need existed and then assessed prison officials’ response to that 
need.142 In totality, the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of the WPATH-SOC and literal 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment erroneously dispose of the Estelle test 
entirely.143 Rather than assessing Gibson’s individualized medical needs, the 
Fifth Circuit created a blanket ban on a specific medical procedure, which nec-
essarily undermines the second Estelle prong.144 Additionally, such a sweeping 
judgment arguably undercuts the Eighth Amendment more broadly by ques-
tioning medical professionals and focusing on typicality, rather than rooting 
the analysis in human dignity and the condition of the plaintiff in an Eighth 
Amendment claim.145 
B. Leave It to the White Coats, Not the Black Robes: The Ninth Circuit’s 
Approach Emphasized Individual Medical Needs 
Both the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho and the Ninth Circuit 
followed precedent to the letter.146 The Fifth Circuit criticized the District of 
Idaho for “not even mention[ing] Kosilek [v. Spencer].”147 This criticism in 
fact highlights the virtue of the Edmo decision.148 Testimony relevant to 
Michelle Kosilek has no bearing on Adree Edmo.149 The Supreme Court illus-
trated the Estelle test by reference to a generic, singular individual.150 The key 
question, then, is whether GCS is medically prudent with regard to an individ-
ual plaintiff’s gender dysphoria, as outlined in authoritative standards of care: 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Id. (holding that an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care requires an allega-
tion of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need). 
 143 See id. (prescribing a deliberate indifference framework for evaluating an inadequate medical 
care claim under the Eighth Amendment); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221–22, 226 (stating that the denial of 
GCS is never unconstitutional for reasons outside of the Estelle analysis). 
 144 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 226 (holding that the denial of GCS can never be unconstitutional, regard-
less of an individual plaintiff’s circumstances); see Edmo v. Corizon, 935 F.3d 757, 795 (9th Cir. 
2019) (per curiam) (explaining how the Gibson decision ignored proper legal analysis of medical care 
for incarcerated transgender persons), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020). 
 145 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (holding that a prison’s failure to provide adequate medical care 
inflicts needless pain and suffering that is detrimental to human dignity); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 226 
(holding that the denial of GCS is never unconstitutional, regardless of a plaintiff’s individual needs); 
Baker, supra note 20, at 10 (highlighting unwritten rights inherent in the Eighth Amendment). 
 146 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (setting forth the deliberate indifference test for considering the 
adequacy of medical care in prisons); Edmo, 935 F.3d at 803 (applying the Estelle test to the context 
of providing GCS in prisons); Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1116 (D. Idaho 
2018) (finding the IDOC’s denial of GCS was unconstitutional under the Estelle test). 
 147 Gibson, 920 F.3d at 225–26. 
 148 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (implying the necessity of an individual analysis of medical 
needs); Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795 (assessing Edmo’s individual needs). 
 149 See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795 (discussing only Edmo’s medical circumstances); see Estelle, 429 
U.S. at 106 (requiring a case-by-case analysis of medical needs). 
 150 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (holding that valid Eighth Amendment claims regarding inade-
quate medical care must allege acts amounting to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need). 
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the WPATH-SOC.151 The Ninth Circuit properly focused its analysis in this 
manner.152 The District of Idaho and the Ninth Circuit used the WPATH-SOC 
as a guidepost for evaluating the care provided to Edmo against a set of ac-
cepted medical standards.153 Departure from those standards gave rise to a 
claim of medical care below a constitutionally acceptable minimum.154 
Courts faced with plaintiffs like Edmo or Gibson in the future should thus 
follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach.155 To ensure this, the Supreme Court 
ought to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s approach if and when it is called upon to 
decide the issue.156 This approach priorities the judgment of the medical com-
munity at large, including medical professionals who understand an individual 
prisoner’s specific medical needs and circumstances.157 
CONCLUSION 
The approach of federal courts across the country to the question of 
whether the denial of GCS for transgender inmates violates the Eighth 
Amendment has been markedly inconsistent. Although the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit held in Kosilek v. Spencer that the denial of GCS for 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794 (assessing the plaintiff’s individual circumstances against 
WPATH-SOC recommendations); Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek III), 774 F.3d 63, 90 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(en banc) (considering the plaintiff’s individual circumstances against the WPATH-SOC’s recom-
mendations); WPATH-SOC supra note 35, at 2 (providing clinical treatment recommendations for 
gender dysphoria). 
 152 See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794 (reviewing only the WPATH-SOC and Edmo’s medical circum-
stances in reaching its ultimate holding); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (suggesting an individual-
ized assessment of the plaintiff’s medical circumstances in Eighth Amendment claims). 
 153 See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794 (relying heavily on the NCCHC-approved WPATH-SOC to inform 
its holding); Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1126 (D. Idaho 2018) (finding the 
WPATH-SOC on point for evaluating the plaintiff’s medical circumstances); see also Estelle, 429 
U.S. at 106 (providing the general framework to assess when prison medical care falls below the con-
stitutional minimum); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2043–44 (2015) (relying on accepted stand-
ards in the medical community to determine the constitutional minimum). 
 154 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 
106 (holding that the inadequate provision of medical care in prisons constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment); Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794 (holding that the WPATH-SOC is an authoritative standard of 
care for incarcerated persons experiencing gender dysphoria). 
 155 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (holding that prison officials cannot exhibit deliberate indifference 
to an incarcerated person’s serious medical need); Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794 (relying on Estelle to reach 
the conclusion that the denial of GCS constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need). 
 156 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (holding that prison officials cannot exhibit deliberate indifference 
to an incarcerated person’s serious medical need); Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794 (relying on Estelle to assess 
whether the denial of GCS constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in the plain-
tiff’s individual circumstance). Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari of Edmo’s case, it re-
mains to be seen if and when the Supreme Court will rule on this issue. See Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. 
Edmo, 141 S. Ct. 610 (2020) (mem.), denying cert. to Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794. 
 157 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (providing a framework for assessing whether medical care in 
prisons falls below the constitutional minimum); Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794 (emphasizing the importance 
of medical evidence in determining the constitutionally adequate standards of care). 
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an incarcerated transgender person was not an Eighth Amendment violation in 
that specific instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used the 
First Circuit’s rationale to improperly make a broad, sweeping holding. The 
Fifth Circuit thus created what is in effect an unconstitutional blanket ban on 
GCS in prisons, regardless of whether GCS is a prudent and adequate treat-
ment for an individual prisoner. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which held an individual plaintiff’s circumstances warranted the provision 
of GCS, rightly criticized the Fifth Circuit’s inconsistency with Eighth Amend-
ment precedent. The Ninth Circuit properly emphasized that such cases are 
appropriately decided on narrow grounds, giving deference to a prisoner’s in-
dividual medical needs and the highly-qualified experts who identify those 
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